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WHAT’S IN A NAME?
CURVER LUXEMBOURG AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR DESIGN
PATENTS
ZACHARY SHUFRO*

“If names are not correct, language will not be in accordance with the truth of
things.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Every single object that an individual can touch in his or her daily life has been
affected by design patent law. It shapes how shoes and handbags are designed, and
how the light switches and doors of houses and apartments are shaped; it influences
the layout of computer keyboards and car dashboards and motors; and it informs and
guides the design of the ubiquitous accessory of the twenty-first century, the
smartphone. Once thought to be a dying field of law, design patents have assumed a
role of prominence in the new millennium. While for roughly a century after the apex
of the industrial revolution, design patents existed as a little-discussed but
nevertheless fundamental form of protection for industrial design—that is, functional,
aesthetically-driven design of useful articles2—in the past few decades, a spate of new
design patent-based litigation has breathed new life into the field, and drawn focus
from industries such as fashion, furniture design, and luxury goods.3
With this increased reliance on design patent protection, United States federal
courts have increasingly become tasked with interpreting century-old dicta and
holdings that discuss appearance-based differences in difficult-to-visualize goods from
a bygone era. It was only a matter of time before a decision emerged that would
fundamentally throw a wrench into the standard procedure of design patent
prosecution. This metaphorical wrench—in actuality, an embellished storage basket—
emerged in the form of the September 2019 Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
decision of Curver Luxembourg, SARL v. Home Expressions, Inc.4 The court, faced with
*
J.D. 2020. University of North Carolina School of Law. The Author would like to thank Elizabeth
Ferrill of Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dunner, LLP, for inspiring this article; Professor
Deborah Gerhardt, for first suggesting that the Author research design patents; Chelsea Pieroni, for
her help in shaping this article; and Christine Xiao and Professor John Conley, for their help in
explaining the minutiae of the patent prosecution process.
1 CONFUCIUS, ANALECTS 13.3 (A. Charles Muller, trans., 2018).
2 See 35 U.S.C. § 171(a) (2020) (“Whoever invents any new, original and ornamental design for
an article of manufacture may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of
this title.”).
3 See, e.g., Bijal Vakil, US Design Patents: An Increasingly Useful Option, WHITE & CASE (Sept.
10, 2019), https://www.whitecase.com/publications/insight/us-design-patents-increasingly-usefuloption [https://perma.cc/Y9TD-WNJT] (“The US Patent and Trademark Office has been receiving
design patent applications at increasing rates over the past decade.”).
4 Curver Lux., SARL v. Home Expressions Inc., 938 F.3d 1334, 1334-43 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
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determining the scope of a design patent’s protection in a manner previously not
considered in existing design patent precedent, held that a design patent’s claim was
limited to the design as used in connection with the article of manufacture expressly
named in the patent’s title and verbal claim.5 Among industry professionals, panic
ensued.6
This Article examines design patent law in the context of the Curver Luxembourg
decision; analysis proceeds in five parts. Part II explains the law of design patents as
it was prior to the Curver Luxembourg decision—providing an overview of the three
key requirements for design patent eligibility, the concept of an article of manufacture,
and the design patent prosecution process. Part III examines the Curver Luxembourg
decision itself: the background of the case, the district court decision, and its
affirmation on appeal. Part IV examines industry reactions to the decision, the
decision’s implications for design patent law, and specifically considers the increased
importance of patent titles and the decision’s impact on the scope of prior art. Part V
concludes.
II. DESIGN PATENT LAW BEFORE CURVER LUXEMBOURG
In the United States, patent law derives from a direct Constitutional mandate
granting Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries[.]”7 Despite its Constitutional origins, design
patent protection was a relatively late addition to the intellectual property protection
scheme available under American law.8 Generally, American patent law is modeled
on the English 1623 Statute of Monopolies,9 and design patent statutes predated
American law on the subject in France and England, among other nations.10 While the
first American design patent statute was adopted by Congress in 1842,11 in the period
before the enactment of this statute, and particularly “prior to 1836, some
entrepreneurs were attempting to use the utility patent regime to obtain design patent

Id. at 1336.
See infra Part IV.
7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
8 See Thomas Hudson, A Brief History of the Development of Design Patent Protection in the
United States, 30 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 380, 380 (1948) (“Designs for article of manufacture had been the
subject matter of statutory protection for many years in European nations before similar laws were
enacted in the United States.”).
9 Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1829); see also An Act Concerning Monopolies and
Dispensations with Penal Laws, and the Forfeitures thereof § 6, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (1623) (“any declaration
before mentioned shall not extend to any letters patents and grants of privilege for the term of fourteen
years or under, hereafter to be made, of the sole working or making of any manner of new
manufactures within this realm to the true and first inventor and inventors of such manufactures,
which others at the time of making such letters patents and grants shall not use, so as also they be
not contrary to the law nor mischievous to the state by raising prices of commodities at home, or hurt
of trade, or generally inconvenient”).
10 Hudson, supra note 8, at 380 (“In France protection was available as early as 1737 and in
England in 1787, by the enactment of the statute of 27 Geo. 3, Ch. 38.”).
11 Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 263, § 3, 5 Stat. 543, 543–44 (1842).
5
6
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protection sub rosa.”12 Spurred by legal developments in design patent protection
abroad,13 and by aggressive domestic lobbying efforts by designers and inventors such
as Jordan L. Mott,14 in 1841 Patent Commissioner Henry Ellsworth recommended that
Congress pass legislation related to “the protection ‘of new and original designs for
articles of manufacture, both in fine and useful arts.’”15 American design patent law
was passed by Congress within the year, notwithstanding unrelated political disputes
that delayed its passage.16
In the intervening 178 years, design patents flourished, withered to becoming
nearly obsolete, and resurged in popularity in recent decades. During the Industrial
Revolution, design patent usage reached its first zenith, particularly among
manufacturers of cast-iron stoves.17 In the twentieth century, design patents quickly
lost their appeal as federal copyright and trademark law developed to a sufficient
extent to encapsulate many of the original concerns of the groups who lobbied for the
passage of the 1842 Design Patent Act—particularly for concerns of passing off and
unfair competition.18 “As these [other] forms of intellectual property protection
developed, the domain of design patents became increasingly more difficult to
discern[,]” and to a large extent their mass draw evaporated.19 Simultaneously, design
patent protections were increasingly and consistently narrowed in scope by court
rulings nationwide, until “[i]n the late 1980s, courts had arguably narrowed design
patents so substantially that Judge Rich remarked acerbically that ‘[d]esign patents
have almost no scope.’”20 Some commentators “argued that during the course of the
twentieth century, design patents had become trivial, functioning as little more than
evidence of title and of priority for filing foreign design applications.”21
12 Jason John Du Mont & Mark Janis, The Origins of American Design Patent Protection, 88 IND.
L. REV. 837, 852–53 (2013). This protection was available despite the lack of a design patent system
because “[f]rom 1793 to 1836, the utility patent system did not subject patent applications to
substantive examination prior to grant, so patents could issue without ever having been scrutinized
for compliance with substantive patentability requirements—including requirements for eligible
subject matter.” Researchers Du Mont and Janis point to a utility patent granted to Walter Hunt in
1834 for a globe-shaped radiant heating stove as one such example of a utility patent whose claims
encompassed “the style, general arrangement and fashion” of the globe, including its decoration with
depictions of the continents. (quoting Heating Stove, U.S. Patent No. 8,006X claim 1 (issued Feb. 8,
1834)).
13 See id. at 861 (“The British Design Registration Act (1839) . . . served as [Maine Senator John]
Ruggles’s source for the requirement of registration, the duration . . . and the exclusive right to use
the design during its respective term of protection.”). See also Designs Registration Act, 2 Vict., c. 17,
§§ 1–8 (1839).
14 Du Mont & Janis, supra note 12, at 856 (“Stove manufacturer Jordan L. Mott set in motion
proposals that eventually grew into design patent legislation.”).
15 Id. at 864 (quoting Ellsworth Report for 1841, S. REP. NO. 27-169, at 1 (dated Jan. 1842,
referred for printing Feb. 7, 1842, and referred to the Patent Committee on Mar. 8, 1842)).
16 Id. at 869–72.
17 Id. at 874.
18 See id. at 843 (“[W]hen design patent protection was introduced in 1842, it was the sole form of
American intellectual property protections for designs. That is no longer true. Under current U.S. law,
designers may seek protection for many types of designs under the copyright and trademark regimes
and may hold those forms of protection concurrently with design patent protection.”).
19 Du Mont & Janis, supra note 12, at 843.
20 Id. (quoting In re Mann, 861 F.2d 1581, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
21 Id.; see Jerry H. Reichmann, Design Protection After the Copyright Act of 1976: A Comparative
View of the Emerging Interim Models, 31 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 267, 298 (1983).
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While they appeared to be nearing relegation to a strange footnote in intellectual
property history, design patents have seen a resurgence to prominence in the past two
decades, following the Federal Circuit’s 2008 decision in Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v.
Swisa, Inc.22 In that case, the Federal Circuit reformulated the laws governing design
patent infringement, updating them from the nineteenth century holding in Gorham,
Co. v. White23 to reflect the realities of design protection in the twenty-first century.24
Commentators correctly predicted that the decision in Egyptian Goddess would
“strengthen design patents, especially those that have been drafted with careful
attention to the novel features to be protected[.]”25 In the past decade, “the Federal
Circuit has handed down important new design patent cases at an unusual pace[]” that
some commentators have described as a renaissance in design patent law.26
Concurrent to this renewed interest in design patent litigation and analysis, “[f]ilings
for U.S. design patents have increased substantially, and this phenomenon is not
confined to the United States.”27 In short, though it once faced a troubling future,
design patent law has returned to prominence at the cutting-edge of intellectual
property protection in the twenty-first century.
A. De Lege Lata
From its very inception, “[t]he purpose of design patents [has been] to promote the
decorative arts[,]” which traditionally “included furniture, metalwork, ceramics,
glassware, and jewelry.”28 This Constitutional mandate works “by providing incentives
for manufacturers to improve the appearance of their products by rewarding the
‘ingenious producer[s] of those appearances.’”29 In keeping with this ornamental
purpose, design patents “may cover: (1) a surface design that is applied to an article of
manufacture; (2) the shape or configuration of all or part of an article; or (3) a
combination of both.”30 A design is only patentable if it is “new, original and
ornamental[,]”31 and “[i]t must also satisfy the statutory requirements that are
applicable to utility patents, including the related requirements of novelty and
nonobviousness.”32

Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 665–683 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
Gorham, Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511 (1872).
24 Du Mont & Janis, supra note 12, at 842.
25 James Juo, Egyptian Goddess: Rebooting Design Patents and Resurrecting Whitman Saddle,
18 FED. CIR. B.J. 429, 450 (2009); see also Myshala E. Middleton, Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa,
Inc.: Design Patent Infringement Revolutionized by an Egyptian Goddess, 17 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP.
L.J. 179, 185 (2009) (Egyptian Goddess served to “streamline future design patent infringement
cases.”).
26 Du Mont & Janis, supra note 12, at 842 n. 26.
27 Id.
28 Sarah Burstein, Visual Invention, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 169, 172 (2012).
29 Id. at 173 (quoting Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 525 (1872)).
30 Id. at 172.
31 35 U.S.C. § 171(a) (2020).
32 Burstein, Visual Invention, supra note 28, at 175.
22
23
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1. Novelty
Novelty is arguably the most straightforward requirement in patent law, and is
relatively clear as applied to design patents. Section 102 of the Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.
§ 102, articulates the “novelty” standard of patentable subject matter, including for
design patents.33 “In order to be novel, a design cannot be ‘substantially the same’ as
a prior design, when viewed by ‘an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a
purchaser usually gives.’”34 Accordingly, a design is not novel if the appearance “is
such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase [the new design]
supposing to be the other[.]”35 In determining the novelty of a design, the ordinary
observer is “deemed to view the differences between the patented design and [a
subsequent similar design] in the context of the prior art.”36 Under the “invention” test
for novelty, “courts [have] often concluded that there was no invention”—and that the
claimed design therefore was not novel—“where the patentee only changed the color,
the material, or the size of an existing design.”37 Novelty is also a bar “where the
applicant merely changed the frequency in an existing pattern[,]”38 and where “the
differences between the claimed design and the prior art were made for functional—
not aesthetic—reasons.”39
2. Non-Obviousness
For over 130 years, settled law has held that “[t]he exercise of the inventive or
originative faculty is required” in creating a patentable design or product,40 and courts
have long accepted that “[i]t is elementary that there must be invention to justify the

33 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2020). Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 171(a) (requiring design patents to be “new, original,
and ornamental”).
34 Burstein, supra note 28, at 175 (quoting Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589
F.3d 1233, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2009)); see also 35 U.S.C. § 102 (novelty requirement for patentable subject
matter generally).
35 Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting
Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1872)).
36 Id. (quoting Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 676 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc)).
37 Burstein, Visual Invention, supra note 28, at 178; see, e.g., In re Mains, 77 F.2d 533, 534
(C.C.P.A. 1935) (choosing red hooks for a horse collar is not novel); In re Campbell, 104 F.2d 394,396
(C.C.P.A. 1939) (a metal bottle shaped like a glass bottle is not novel just because it is made of metal);
Nat Lewis Purses, Inc., v. Carole Bags, Inc., 83 F.2d 475, 476 (2d Cir. 1936) (affirming the invalidity
of a design patent for a purse based on a prior design whose sole novelty was a new size); WILLIAM
LEONARD SYMONS, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR DESIGNS 56 (1914) (a “change in color, material or size
[is] not invention”).
38 Burstein, Visual Invention, supra note 28, at 178; see, e.g., In re Barber, 62 F.2d 364, 364
(C.C.P.A. 1932) (affirming denial of a design patent where “the only appreciable difference . . . is that,
in the reference, there are but three corrugations in each longitudinal strip,” and the primary
reference contained “a greater number of such stripes”).
39 Burstein, Visual Invention, supra note 28, at 178–79; see, e.g., Strause Gas Iron Co. v. William
M. Crane Co., 235 F. 126, 131 (2d Cir. 1916) (“The modification of these forms into the design patent
does not seem to us to have been dictated by other than utilitarian considerations.”); In re Eifel, 35
F.2d 70, 71 (C.C.P.A. 1929) (the only differences between the claimed design and the prior art were
“useful modifications”).
40 Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co., 148 U.S. 674, 679 (1893).
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grant of a design patent.”41 While “[t]here was no statutory requirement of
nonobviousness for the first 110 years of United States design patent protection[,]”
courts and the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) “have long
required that patentable designs demonstrate something more than mere novelty.”42
This higher standard is “based on the constitutional command that patents[,]”
including design patents, “be used to ‘promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.’”43 After
the enactment of the Patent Act of 1952,44 the United States Supreme Court held that
“the general level of innovation necessary to sustain patentability[]” remained
unchanged.45 To determine if the subject matter of a patent is sufficiently nonobvious,
the Court explained that “[u]nder § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to
be determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be
ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved.”46 For utility
patents, the “scope and content of the prior art”47 that can be cited against a patent
application “is generally limited to references from the same ‘field of art’ as the claimed
invention and to other fields that are ‘sufficiently analogous to the art with which each
patent is concerned that a person with a problem in the latter field would look to the
former field to adopt a solution to the problem devised there.’”48 This rule is intended
to limit the scope of the prior art to fields that are “reasonably pertinent to the
particular problem with which the inventor is involved.”49
For design patents, by contrast, a determination of the scope of the prior art is
more complex, as it diverged from the utility patent test that came out of the seminal

In re Lobl, 75 F.2d 219, 220 (C.C.P.A. 1935).
Burstein, Visual Invention, supra note 28, at 176. While the first design patent statute was
enacted in 1842, see Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 263, § 3, 5 Stat. 543, 543–44 (1842), it was not until the
enactment of the 1952 Patent Act that a specific non-obviousness requirement was added. See Patent
Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 103, 66 Stat. 792, 798 (1952). Interim design patent statutes nevertheless
required that the design be the product of the patentee’s “genius.” See Act of Mar. 2, 1861, ch. 88, § 11,
12 Stat. 246, 248 (1861); Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 71, 16 Stat. 198, 210 (1870); 60 U.S. REV. STAT.
§ 4929 (1874).
43 Roanwell Corp. v. Plantronics, Inc., 429 U.S. 1004, 1006 (1976) (White, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
44 Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 103, 66 Stat. 792, 798 (1952), codified as 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.
(2020).
45 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 3–4 (1966).
46 Id. at 17.
47 Id.
48 Burstein, Visual Invention, supra note 28, at 182 (quoting Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. LibbeyOwens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 620 (Fed. Cir. 1985)); see also In re Klein, 647 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (current version of this test); but see 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 5.03[1]
(2020) (“A long-standing problem with the obviousness test of patentability is the determination of
the pertinent art in terms of scope.”).
49 Innovation Toys, LLC v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 637 F.3d 1314, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting In re
Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
41
42
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1956 Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (“C.C.P.A.”)50 decision In re Glavas.51 In
Glavas, the United States Patent Office rejected a design patent for a swimming float,
citing to (among other references) a pillow and a “baby supporter . . . in the form of a
wedge-shaped cushion.”52 The Patent Office’s Board of Appeals affirmed, stating that
“it is well established that all arts are analogous in considering the shape of an
object.”53 Underscoring this principle, the Board’s decision cited “additional references
disclosing designs for soap, bottles, and a razor blade sharpener.”54 While the C.C.P.A.
rejected on appeal “the general proposition that ‘all arts are analogous so far as designs
are concerned[,]’”55 it held that if “the prior art discloses any [single] article of
substantially the same appearance as that of an applicant, it is immaterial what the
use of such article is[,]”56 as the intended use of an article “has no bearing on its
patentability as a design.”57 Rather, the proper inquiry when examining two visually
similar products is “whether they are so related that the appearance of certain
ornamental features in one would suggest the application of those features to the
other.”58 For surface ornamentation, the C.C.P.A. held that “it is immaterial whether
the surface in question is that of wall paper [sic], an oven door, or a piece of crockery.”59
For design configuration, however, “the nature of the articles involved is a definite
factor in determining whether the proposed change” is novel in light of the prior art
and cited references.60
The Glavas test for determining the scope of analogous art outlived the C.C.P.A.
by eleven years, but in 1993 the Federal Circuit released an unpublished opinion61 in
which the majority62 held that the proper scope of analogous art for a nonobviousness
inquiry was limited to designs for articles with “the same general use as that claimed
in the design patent application.”63 The Federal Circuit followed this new rule in a
published, binding opinion several years later,64 announcing that in determining
whether a claimed design is obvious, “[t]he scope of the prior art is not the universe of
50 Prior to 1982, the C.C.P.A. exercised sole nationwide jurisdiction over patent appeals and
appeals from the United States Patent Office. See Burstein, Visual Invention, supra note 28, at 182.
In 1982, however, Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (the “Federal Circuit”
or “C.A.F.C.”), which subsumed the role of the C.C.P.A. in patent jurisprudence. See Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982); see also id. § 127(a)(4), codified as
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4) (2020) (providing that the Federal Circuit “shall have exclusive jurisdiction”
over all “appeal[s] from a decision of (A) the Patent Trial and Appeal Board . . . [or] (C) a district court
to which a case was directed pursuant to” the federal patent infringement statutes, 35 U.S.C. §§ 145,
146, 154(b)). In its first published opinion, South Corp. v. United States, the Federal Circuit adopted
all prior decisions of the C.C.P.A. as binding precedent. 960 F.2d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982) (en banc).
51 In re Glavas, 230 F.2d 447, 447–451 (C.C.P.A. 1956).
52 Id. at 448.
53 Id. at 449.
54 Burstein, Visual Invention, supra note 28, at 183.
55 Id. (quoting In re Glavas, 230 F.2d 447, 450 (C.C.P.A. 1956)).
56 Glavas, 230 F.2d at 450.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 In re Butera, No. 93-1041, 1993 WL 185206 (Fed. Cir. June 1, 1993) (unpublished opinion).
62 Id. at *2 (one judge dissented without opinion).
63 Id.
64 Hupp v. Siroflex of Am., Inc., 122 F.3d 1456, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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abstract design and artistic creativity, but designs of the same article of manufacture
or of articles sufficiently similar that a person of ordinary skill would look to such
articles for their designs.”65 However, the Federal Circuit, failed to provide any
guidance on how to identify such a “sufficiently similar” article.66
In determining whether a design patent claim is sufficiently nonobvious under
§ 103, “[t]he Federal Circuit has frequently expressed concern regarding the possibility
for hindsight bias[,] . . . especially in situations where a finding of obviousness is based
on a combination of references.”67 To avoid “the tempting but forbidden zone of
hindsight” in assessing whether a claimed design is nonobvious,68 the Federal Circuit
created the “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” (“TSM”) test, under which “a patent
claim is only proved obvious if some motivation or suggestion to combine the prior art
teachings can be found in the prior art, the nature of the problem, or the knowledge of
a person having ordinary skill in the art.”69 As applied to utility patents, the TSM test
is not a clean fit for design patents, as “it is the overall appearance, the visual effect as
a whole of the design, which must be taken into consideration[]” in assessing
nonobviousness.70 To address this imperfect fit, the Federal Circuit has tailored a
variant of the TSM test for design patents, to help “determine whether a design’s
overall appearance—not just its constituent parts—are taught or suggested by the
prior art.”71 Under the TSM test variant that has developed for design patents, a
designer who cobbles together a Frankenstein’s monster “of known elements” is not
prevented from attaining a design patent “absent some basis whereby a designer of
ordinary skill would be led [by the prior art] to create [such a] particular design.”72
The design patent version of the TSM test first emerged in the 1982 C.C.P.A.
decision of In re Rosen,73 and further caselaw established two different types of prior
art references for design patents: primary references and secondary references.74 As
the C.C.P.A. articulated, in order for a design to be obvious, “there must be a reference,
a something in existence[]”—the primary reference—“the design characteristics of
which are basically the same as the claimed design[.]”75 However, “two designs are not
‘basically the same’ if ‘major modifications would be required to make [the prior design]
look like the claimed design[.]’”76 As clarified by the Federal Circuit, “a proper primary
reference must be similar to the claimed design in its actual appearance, not just in its
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
67 Burstein, Visual Invention, supra note 28, at 186 (citing Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781
F.2d 861, 873 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
68 Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 873 (Fed. Cir. 1985), overruled on other grounds
by Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
69 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 407 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (the TSM test is “the best defense against
the subtle but powerful attraction of a hindsight-based obviousness”), overruled on other grounds by
In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
70 In re Rosen, 673 F.2d 388, 390 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
71 Burstein, Visual Invention, supra note 28, at 187.
72 L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
73 In re Rosen, 673 F.2d 388 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
74 Burstein, Visual Invention, supra note 28, at 187.
75 Rosen, 673 F.2d at 391.
76 Burstein, Visual Invention, supra note 28, at 187 (quoting In re Harvey, 12 F.3d 1061, 1063
(Fed. Cir. 1993)).
65
66
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design concept.”77 Once and only if a primary reference is identified, “other ‘secondary’
references ‘may be used to modify it to create a design that has the same overall visual
appearance as the claimed design.’”78 While this rule at first appears quite broad, the
Federal Circuit has limited its applicability quite significantly, holding that “secondary
references may only be used to modify the primary reference if they are ‘so related [to
the primary reference] that the appearance of ornamental features in one would
suggest the application of those features to the other.’”79
The Rosen variant of the TSM does not define the exact scope of the prior art that
must be examined, nor the scope of fields that are sufficiently related to one another
as to contain appropriate secondary references.80 Furthermore, while a determination
of obviousness in the utility patent context requires the prior art to ‘“suggest[] the
overall appearance of the claimed design’ to a person having ordinary skill in the
art[,]”81 dicta in a 2009 Federal Circuit case82 has indicated that in the design patent
context, “the role of one skilled in the art in the obviousness context lies only in
determining whether to combine earlier references to arrive at a single piece of art for
comparison with the potential design or to modify a single prior art reference.”83
However, “[o]nce that piece of prior art has been constructed, obviousness . . . requires
application of the ordinary observer test, not the view of one skilled in the art.”84 While
this clarification was dicta, and “it is unclear whether the Federal Circuit will treat
[it] . . . as an accurate statement of the law in future cases,”85 at least one high-profile
design patent case has been decided under this revised standard.86

Id.; see also In re Harvey, 12 F.3d 1061, 1063 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 566 F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting
Durling v. Spectrum Furniture Co., 101 F.3d 100, 103 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
79 Durling v. Spectrum Furniture Co., 101 F.3d 100, 103 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (alteration in original)
(quoting In re Borden, 90 F.3d 1570, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1996)); see also Titan Tire Corp., 566 F.3d at 1381.
80 See Burstein, Visual Invention, supra note 28, at 187–88.
81 Id. at 187 (quoting In re Cho, 813 F.2d 378, 382 (Fed. Cir. 1987)); see also 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
(2020) (“A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the
time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art.”) (emphasis added)).
82 Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1233–1244 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
83 Id. at 1240.
84 Id. (emphasis added).
85 See Burstein, Visual Invention, supra note 28, at 188 n. 131.
86 See Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., No. 11-cv-01846-LHK, 2011 WL 7036077, at *12
(N.D. Cal. Dec.2, 2011) (unreported slip opinion) (citing Seaway, 589 F.3d at 1240), aff’d in part,
vacated, remanded, and rehr’g en banc denied, 678 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2012), appeal dismissed 2012
WL 2401680 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2012). The related final appeal in this case, regarding the definition
of an “article of manufacture” as mentioned in 35 U.S.C. § 171(a), was heard by the United Stated
Supreme Court in 2016, ending over five years of litigation. See Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. Apple,
Inc., 920 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1079–1116 (N.D. Cal. 2013), aff’d on re-trial, 926 F. Supp. 2d 1100, 1100–
1120 (N.D. Cal. 2013), vacated and remanded in part, aff’d in part, 786 F.3d 983, 983–1005 (Fed. Cir.
2015), cert. granted in part, 1346 S. Ct. 1453 (2016), rev’d and remanded, 137 S. Ct. 429, 429–436
(2016), aff’d and remanded, 678 F. App’x 1012, 1012–1014 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
77
78
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3. Ornamentality
Ornamentality is the key divergence between the subject matter of a design patent
and a utility patent: while utility patents must be useful, and cannot protect mere
decorative feature, the inverse is true for design patents.87 “Ornamentality has been
an explicit requirement for design patentability since 1902.”88 As explained in the
MPEP, “[t]he ornamental appearance for an article includes its shape/configuration or
surface ornamentation applied to the article, or both.”89 While at present “the phrase
‘new and original’” as included in the design patent statute, Section 171(a), “has not
been given independent significance in design patent law.”90 Federal Circuit dicta has
suggested that this requirement “likely was designed to incorporate the copyright
concept of originality—requiring that the work be original with the author[]”91—due to
the intertwined history of design patent protection and early copyright protections in
industrial designs.92
Current design patent law is quite generous in its interpretation of ornamentality;
as the Federal Circuit has articulated, “[o]rnamentation may lie in the shape of the
article of manufacture, as well as in an arbitrary decoration upon it.”93 Furthermore,
“[u]nder current Federal Circuit case law, a design will be deemed ‘ornamental’ unless:
(1) there are no alternative designs with ‘the same or similar functional capabilities,’
or (2) the design is concealed during the entire lifetime of the completed product.”94
Because “[t]here are almost always alternative designs available[,]” and because
“almost every part of every product is visible to someone at some point during the
product’s lifecycle, even if only during repairs[,]” almost every design patent
application survives the ornamentality test.95

87 Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 171(a) (2020) (requiring design patents to be “new, original, and ornamental”
(emphasis added)) with 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2020) (requiring utility patents to encompass “ay new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof[]”) (emphasis added)).
88 Sarah Burstein, The “Article of Manufacture” in 1887, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 7 (2017); see
Act of May 9, 1902, ch. 783, 32 Stat. 193, 193 (revising Rev. Stat. § 4929); Act of July 19, 1952, ch.
950, 66 Stat. 805 (codified as 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2020)).
89 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1502.01 (9th ed. 2015) [hereinafter MPEP].
90 Burstein, The “Article of Manufacture” in 1887, supra note 88, at 7 n. 26.
91 Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing 1–
2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01 (2005)). For a discussion in
the comparatively lower originality threshold requirement in copyright law, see Feist Publications,
Inc. v. Rural Telephone Servs. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (copyrightable subject matter must
“possess[] at least some minimal degree of creativity[]”).
92 Du Mont & Janis, supra note 12, at 862–72.
93 In re Cho, 813 F.2d 378, 383 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (Newman, J., dissenting).
94 Burstein, The “Article of Manufacture” in 1887, supra note 88, at 7 (quoting Ethicon EndoSurgery, Inc. v. Covidien, Inc., 796 F.3d 1312, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2015)); see also In re Webb, 916 F.2d
1553, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (quoting In re Stevens, 173 F.2d 1015, 1016 (C.C.P.A. 1949) (“[T]he
[ornamentality] inquiry must extend to whether at some point in the life of the article an occasion (or
occasions) arises when the appearance of the article becomes a ‘matter of concern.’”); Sarah Burstein,
Commentary: Faux Amis in Design Law, 105 TRADEMARK REP. 1455, 1457 (2016) (explaining the
Federal Circuit’s “hidden in use” rule).
95 Burstein, The “Article of Manufacture” in 1887, supra note 88, at 7.
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B. The “Article of Manufacture”
Section 171(a) of the patent act specifies that design patent protection extends to
“any new, original, and ornamental design for an article of manufacture.”96 In the first
160 years after the passage of the original Design Patent Act,97 the design claimed qua
design was the primary focus of infringement litigation, as “[t]he test for design patent
infringement, ‘as it was understood in the late nineteenth century, required the
factfinder to compare the entire article invented and produced by the patentee to the
entire article sold or manufactured by the defendant, regardless of the patent's claim
language.’”98 However, today—while the specific claim of a patent is key to an
infringement action—a court must “identify the ‘article of manufacture’ to which [an]
infringed design has been applied[,]” in order to “calculate the infringer’s total profit
made on that article of manufacture[]” for the purposes of “arriving at a damages
award under § 289 [of the Patent Act].”99 Unlike the injunctive relief (§ 283)100 and
adequate damages or “reasonable royalty” (§ 284)101 provisions of the Patent Act, § 289
governs “an award of the infringer’s profits” in specific circumstances—as an
alternative to royalty damages.102 When the Supreme Court reviewed § 289 while
determining a design patent infringement case in 2016, it refused to “set out a test for
identifying the relevant article of manufacture at the first step of the [] damages
inquiry.”103 The Federal Circuit similarly demurred,104 and the issue of what
constitutes an “article of manufacture” has thereafter remained a subject of debate.105
While a significant amount of ink has been spilled discussing what exactly
constitutes an “article of manufacture” for the purposes of § 289,106 these discussions
35 U.S.C. § 171(a) (2020) (emphasis added).
Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 263, § 3, 5 Stat. 543, 543–44 (1842).
98 Sarah Burstein, The “Article of Manufacture” Today, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 781, 787 (2018)
(quoting Burstein, The “Article of Manufacture” in 1887, supra note 88, at 12 n. 64 (citing Jennings v.
Kibbe, 10 F. 669, 670–71 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882); Ex parte Gerard, 1888 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 37, 45).
99 Samsung Elecs. Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 434 (2016) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2020)).
100 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2020).
101 Id. § 284.
102 Burstein, The “Article of Manufacture” Today, supra note 98, at 789.
103 Samsung Elecs. Co., 137 S. Ct. at 436.
104 See Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 678 F. App'x 1012, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (remanding the
case to the district court); Nordock Inc. v. Sys. Inc., 681 F. App'x 965, 967 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (vacating
an earlier judgment and remanding to the district court for redetermination in light of the Court’s
decision in Samsung v. Apple).
105 See, e.g., Perry Saidman, Elizabeth Ferrill, Damon Neagle & Tracy Durkin, Determining the
“Article of Manufacture” Under 35 U.S.C. 289, 99 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 349, 355 (2017)
(proposing a multi-factor test to determine the relevant article of manufacture).
106 Id. at 355 (suggesting a test for identifying the relevant article of manufacture); Elizabeth M.
Gil, Note, Samsung v. Apple: Taking A Bite Out of the Design Patent “Article of Manufacture”
Controversy, 25 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 67, 86 (2017) (discussing what constitutes an “article of
manufacture” in the aftermath of Samsung v. Apple); Rachel Johns, Case Comment, Samsung v.
Apple: A Proposal for “Article of Manufacture,” 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 93, 101 (2017) (endorsing the
Government's test as laid out in its amicus curiae brief in Samsung v. Apple). See also PATRICK J.
FLINN, HANDBOOK OF INTELL. PROP. CLAIMS & REMEDIES § 6.05 (2017) (noting that, after Samsung
v. Apple, “[l]ower courts must now determine the relevant ‘article of manufacture’ for each of the
infringed design patents”); HOWARD C. ANAWALT & EVE BROWN, IP STRATEGY: COMPLETE INTELL.
PROP. PLANNING § 1:38 (2017) (“Practical implications [of Samsung v. Apple] may include a new
96
97
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are beyond the scope of the issues addressed in this Article. Rather, for the purposes
of this Article, it is important to focus on what an article of manufacture traditionally
does not constitute by nature of its identification: an express limitation on the scope of
the patented design.107 While a patent application must “identif[y] the article in which
the design is embodied by the name generally known and used by the public” within
both the title and the written claim,108 Examining Attorneys are instructed in the
MPEP to “afford the applicant substantial latitude in the language of the title/claim.”109
For some design patents, the article of manufacture is inherently limiting, due to
the type of design that the patent claims; this dichotomy has developed because
“[h]istorically, design patents were understood to protect two classes of designs,
designs for ‘surface ornamentation applied to an article’ and designs for ‘the
configuration or shape of an article.’”110 While design patents for “the configuration or
shape of an article” of manufacture (or for “the combination of configuration and
surface ornamentation[]” of an article of manufacture) are by their very nature limited
in scope to the design as applied to that specific article of manufacture, design patents
for “the surface ornamentation applied to an article of manufacture[]” may not be so
limited in scope.111 As Section 289 itself reads, infringement liability can be found for
any individual who “(1) applies the patented design, or any colorable imitation thereof,
to any article of manufacture for the purpose of sale, or (2) sells or exposes for sale any
article of manufacture to which such design or colorable imitation has been
applied[.]”112 Indeed, the MPEP similarly specifies that “the subject matter” of a design
patent “is the design embodied in or as applied to an article of manufacture (or portion
thereof) and not the article itself.”113 Accordingly, the importance of the article of
manufacture as it relates to the scope of this Article is determined by the type of design
patent at issue.
C. The Design Prosecution Process
All patents—be they utility patents or design patents—undergo a prosecution
process involving application and disclosure of the invention, review by an Examining
Attorney at the USPTO, and (for successful applications) an eventual grant of

requirement in design patent cases that claims be individually parsed rather than analyzed
holistically.”).
107 See MPEP, supra note 89, §§ 1503.01(I), 1503.01(III) (“The title . . . may contribute to defining
the scope of the claim.” The title and the written claim of a design patent must both specify an article
of manufacture to which the design is applied (in the case of surface ornamentation) or in which the
design is embodied (in the case of product configuration)).
108 Id. §§ 1503.01(I), 1503.01(III).
109 Id. § 1503.01(I).
110 Burstein, The “Article of Manufacture” Today, supra note 98, at 785–86 (quoting Burstein, The
“Article of Manufacture” in 1887, supra note 88, at 8). See also In re Zahn, 617 F.2d 261, 268 (C.C.P.A.
1980) (“§ 171 . . . is inclusive of ornamental designs of all kinds[,] including surface ornamentation as
well as configuration of goods”).
111 MPEP, supra note 89, § 1502.
112 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2020) (emphasis added).
113 MPEP, supra note 89, § 1502 (emphasis added).
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registration.114 There are two major aspects of the patent prosecution process that
together determine whether a patent will be granted, and the extent of the protection
afforded by its claim: USPTO review and prosecution history estoppel. These factors
can be closely inter-related: for example, when an Examining Attorney compares the
claims within the application to the prior art in order to determine if the claimed
design/invention is anticipated by the prior art, he or she can request that the claimed
design or invention be narrowed as a condition of granting the patent, which can in
turn raise issues of prosecution history estoppel in later infringement litigation related
to the patent granted.
1. USPTO Review
Design patent applications are subjected to a similar substantive examination at
the USPTO as that which is applied to utility patents.115 However, “while utility
patents can include multiple claims covering multiple inventions, a design patent can
only include one claim.”116 Therefore, “[r]estrictions will be required . . . if a design
patent application claims multiple designs that are patentably distinct from each
other.”117 This is not to say that a design can only be claimed for one specific
application—a claim can “encompass multiple articles,” including paired or matching
set articles,118 or if the multiple embodiments of the claimed design “involve a single
inventive concept according to the obviousness-type double patenting practice for
designs.”119 It is at the Examining Attorney’s discretion to make the determination of
whether or not “multiple purported embodiments . . . are actually distinct inventions,”
upon a determination of which they can “issue a restriction requirement[]” for the
application.120 “If the applicant cannot—or chooses not to try to—overcome the
requirement, the applicant must choose which design [he or she] will continue to
prosecute in that application.”121 The unprosecuted designs that are dropped as part
of a restriction requirement can come into play at a later date in an infringement
context, through the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel.122
A design patent’s sole claim largely consists of the visual depictions in the
application’s drawings.123 The drawings can be in monochrome or in color, and can
114 See Sarah Burstein, Costly Designs, 77 OHIO STATE L.J. 107, 112–17 (2016). See also 35 U.S.C.
§ 131 (2020) (requiring substantive examination for patent applications before the patent is granted).
115 See 35 U.S.C. § 131 (2020) (requiring substantive examination for patent applications, without
differentiating between utility and design patents).
116 Burstein, Costly Designs, supra note 114, at 113. See also 37 C.F.R. § 1.153(a) (2020) (“More
than one claim is neither required nor permitted.”).
117 MPEP, supra note 89, § 1504.05, at 1500-50.
118 Id. § 1504.01(b) (citing Ex parte Gibson, 20 U.S.P.Q. 249 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1933)).
119 Id. § 1504.05 (citing In re Rubernfield, 270 F.2d 391 (C.C.P.A. 1959)).
120 Burstein, Costly Designs, supra note 114, at 113.
121 Id. See MPEP, supra note 89, § 1504.05(III) (outlining how one can overcome a restriction
requirement). See also id. § 818, at 800–85 (requiring an applicant to proceed with only one design
when he or she cannot overcome a restriction requirement).
122 See infra Part II(c)(ii).
123 37 C.F.R. § 1.153(a) (2020) (“The claim shall be in formal terms to the ornamental design . . . as
shown, or as shown and described.”). See also MPEP, supra note 89, § 1503.01(III) at 1500-7
(incorporating 37 C.F.R. § 1.153(a) into the substantive examination of a design patent).
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even include photographs;124 if “color photographs or color drawings[]” are submitted,
then the Examining Attorney will consider color as “an integral part of the disclosed
and claimed design.”125 Furthermore, a design patent application can claim only a
portion of the appearance of an article of manufacture:126 “[a]ccording to the [USPTO’s]
current drawing conventions, the claimed portion(s) of the design must be shown in
solid lines[,]” while “broken or dotted lines [can] indicate unclaimed portions” of the
configuration of the article of manufacture itself.127 This method of delineation of the
precise claim in a design patent’s drawings is useful as it “disclose[s] the environment
related to the design” and “define[s] the bounds of the claimed design . . . when the
boundary does not exist in reality in the article [of manufacture] embodying the
design[,]” as “[i]t would be understood that the claimed design extends to the boundary
but does not include the boundary.”128 Applicants can even “broaden their claims—in
amendments or later applications—by changing solid lines to broken lines.”129 Once
124 See MPEP, supra note 89, §§ 1503.02, 1503.02(V) (rules for drawings); (rules for photographs
and color drawings).
125 Id. § 1503.02(V) at 1500-13. As commentator Sarah Burstein explains, this approach to the
role of color in a design patent claim is relatively new, as
[u]ntil recently, an applicant who wished to submit a color drawing or photograph
had to first submit a special petition—and pay an additional fee. The petition had
to “explain that color drawings or color photographs [were] necessary because color
is an integral part of the claimed design.” Effective May 13, 2015, however, no such
petition or fee is required.
Burstein, Costly Designs, supra note 114, at 113–14 n. 47 (internal citations omitted) (quoting MPEP,
supra note 89, § 1503.02(V) at 1500-11). See also Changes to Implement the Hague Agreement
Concerning International Registration of Industrial Designs, 80 FED. REG. 17918, 17930 (Apr. 2, 2015)
(amending 37 C.F.R. § 184(a)(2)) (“Section 1.84(a)(2) is amended to eliminate the requirement for a
petition and fee set forth in § 1.17(h) to accept color drawings or photographs in design applications.”).
126 See In re Zahn, 617 F.2d 261, 267 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (a design patent application can contain “a
claim to a design [for an article of manufacture] which is embodied in less than all of an article of
manufacture[]”). See also Burstein, Costly Designs, supra note 114, at 114 n. 49 (“the United States
allows partial design claiming”).
127 Burstein, Costly Designs, supra note 114, at 114. See also MPEP, supra note 89, § 1503.02(II)
at 1500-10, 1500-11 Form ¶ 15.50 (“The ornamental design which is being claimed must be shown in
solid lines in the drawing.”).
128 MPEP, supra note 89, § 1503.02(II) at 1500-10.
129 Burstein, Costly Designs, supra note 114, at 115 (citing MPEP, supra note 89, § 1504.04, at
1500-47). See Scott D. Locke, Fifth Avenue and the Patent Lawyer: Strategies for Using Design Patents
to Increase the Value of Fashion and Luxury Goods Companies, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL PROP. L.
40, 42 (2005). While the use of amendments or later applications to broaden claims has some routine
uses, commentator Perry Saidman has noted how this method can also be used to an anticompetitive
end. See Perry J. Saidman, The Crisis in the Law of Designs, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y
301, 319 (2007). As Sarah Burstein explains,
[f]irst, the applicant files an application that claims the entire design of a new
product. “Then, while that application is pending, the company files one or more
continuation [or divisional applications] that claim [a smaller] portion[] of the
design.” Assuming the new application could claim priority to the original
application, this strategy allows a design patent applicant to go back to the
[USPTO] and capture competing products that were introduced after the first
design patent application was filed—even if those competing products did not
infringe the original patent claim. Importantly, there is no requirement that the
smaller portion or portions claimed in a continuation (or divisional) represent an
important, distinctive [,]or otherwise salient design feature.
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the Examining Attorney has completed their substantive examination of the finalized
application, the patent will be granted.130
2. Prosecution History Estoppel
Prosecution history estoppel is closely related to the prosecution process of a
patent, as the name implies, but is in fact a defense that can be raised by the defendant
in an infringement claim.131 The doctrine of “prosecution history estoppel limits the
bounds of what a patentee can claim as equivalent by ‘requir[ing] that the claims of a
patent be interpreted in light of the proceedings in the [USPTO] during the application
process.’”132 This defense to claims of infringement is derived from general equitable
principles stemming from the strongly anticompetitive nature of patents: while a
patentee has exclusive rights to the production or sale of any “colorable imitation” of
her patented design,133 her rights to exclude others from producing that specific
invention or design extend only as far as the claims in which the patent was granted.134
As the Supreme Court explained,
Where the patentee in the course of his application in the patent office has,
by amendment, cancelled or surrendered claims, those which are allowed are
to be read in the light of those abandoned and an abandoned claim cannot be
revived and restored to the patent by reading it by construction into the
claims which are allowed.135
This limitation on the patentee’s ability to claim that infringement has occurred
“disallows the reclaiming of material that was disclaimed or narrowed during
prosecution of a claim.”136 In determining whether a defendant has appropriately
raised a defense of prosecution history estoppel, a court must consider “three
questions: (a) whether there was a surrender of claim scope; (b) whether the surrender
Burstein, Costly Designs, supra note 114, at 115–16 (internal citations omitted). This method of
exploiting the design patent system may appear unscrupulous, but it has been discussed with
approval by the Federal Circuit, who stated in dicta that “there is nothing improper, illegal or
inequitable in filing a patent application for the purpose of obtaining a right to exclude a known
competitor’s product from the market; nor is it in any manner improper to amend or insert claims
intended to cover a competitor’s product[.]” Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863
F.2d 867, 874 (Fed. Cir. 1988). Absent any change in the design patent landscape, it is likely this
exploitation will continue.
130 See 35 U.S.C. § 131 (2020).
131 See, e.g., Curver Luxembourg, SARL v. Home Expressions, Inc., Civ. No. 2:17-cv-4079-KMJBC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3792, at * 10 (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2018).
132 Pac. Coast Marine Windshields Ltd. v. Malibu Boats, LLC, 739 F.3d 694, 700 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733 (2002)).
133 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2020).
134 See Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 311 U.S. 211, 218 (1940).
135 Id.
136 Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark P. McKenna, Claiming Design, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 123, 178 n. 250
(2018). See also Pac. Coast Marine Windshields, 739 F.3d at 701 (quoting Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at
734 ) (“Where subject matter is surrendered during prosecution, prosecution history estoppel prevents
the patentee from ‘recaptur[ing] in an infringement action the very subject matter surrendered as a
condition of receiving the patent.’”).
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was for reasons of patentability; and (c) whether the accused design is within the scope
of the surrender.”137
While in the past it was unclear whether prosecution history estoppel applied in
the context of design patents, largely due to the nature of a design patent, which can
only have one claim and which presents its claim in drawing form,138 a 2014 Federal
Circuit case involving the design patent for the windshield of a motor boat clarified
that prosecution history estoppel is a valid defense to claims of design patent
infringement.139 The Federal Circuit further clarified that “while [the court] looks
primarily to the wording of the claims in utility patents for the purpose of prosecution
history estoppel, [it] must look at the requisite drawings in design patents to determine
whether a surrender has occurred.”140 Accordingly, “[p]rosecution history estoppel only
bars an infringement claim if the accused design fell within the scope of the
surrendered subject matter[,]” as depicted in the drawings or language of the amended
design patent application itself.141 Significantly, however, such a surrender is not
limited to amendments to the drawings of a design patent, as the Supreme Court “has
held that ‘[e]stoppel arises when an amendment is made to secure the patent and the
amendment narrows the patent's scope,’ expressly stating that ‘a narrowing
amendment made to satisfy any requirement of the Patent Act may give rise to an
estoppel.’”142 Therefore, prosecution history estoppel can be raised as a defense in
relation to any change to a design patent application during the prosecution process
that (1) was entered in order to ensure the grant of the patent and that (2) constrains
the claimed design.143
III. CURVER LUXEMBOURG, SARL V. HOME EXPRESSIONS, INC.
In Curver Luxembourg, SARL v. Home Expressions, Inc.,144 the original issue
before the district court was a sole claim of design patent infringement.145 The plaintiff,
Curver Luxembourg (“Curver”), is a Luxembourg-based corporation which designs and
manufactures furniture; the defendant, Home Expressions, is another furniture and

137 Curver Luxembourg, SARL v. Home Expressions, Inc., Civ. No. 2:17-cv-4079-KM-JBC, 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3792, at *10 (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2018).
138 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.153(a) (2020) (“The claim shall be in formal terms to the ornamental design
for the article (specifying name) as shown, or as shown and described. More than one claim is neither
required nor permitted.”). See also MPEP, supra note 89, § 1503.01 (specifying a limit of one claim
per design patent).
139 See Pac. Coast Marine Windshields Ltd. v. Malibu Boats, LLC, 739 F.3d 694, 702 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
140 Id.
141 Id. at 704. See Wang Labs., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elecs. Am., Inc., 103 F.3d 1571, 1578 (Fed. Cir.
1997) ("Once prosecution history estoppel limits the scope of a patent, the patentee may not recover
for infringement where infringement would require an equivalence between a claim element and an
aspect of the accused item that falls within the estoppel.").
142 Pac. Coast Marine Windshields, 739 F.3d at 703–04 (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736 (emphasis added) (2002)).
143 Id.
144 Curver Luxembourg, SARL v. Home Expressions, Inc., Civ. No. 2:17-cv-4079-KM-JBC, 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3792 (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2018).
145 Id. at *3.
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storage receptacle company, based in New Jersey.146 Curver is the registered owner of
a design patent, Patent No. D677,946 (“the ‘946 Patent”), “which claims an overlapping
‘Y’ design[]” as shown in Figure 1.147

Figure 1
The design encompassed a woven pattern formed by the “Y” shaped, which not
only created a two-dimensional pattern, but also created a woven textured surface as
shown in Figure 2.148

Figure 2

Id. at *2.
Id. at *1
148 U.S. Patent No. D677,946 S fig. 5 (filed Apr. 8, 2011).
146
147
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Curver employees Nikolai Duvigneau and Zichron Yaacov, the official inventors
of this design, filed an application for a design patent in this pattern on April 8, 2011,149
and thereafter assigned the application to Curver during the prosecution process.150
“Curver’s original design patent application was not accepted by the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office[,]” as the original application was “for a design patent with the
title ‘Furniture Part’ and ‘Furniture (Part of).’”151 The USPTO issued an Office Action
objecting to this title, citing to the parallel provisions in the Code of Federal
Regulations and MPEP which provide that “[t]he title of the design must designate the
particular article, which is the subject of the design.”152 In responding to this Office
Action, “Curver rectified this [objection] by resubmitting the design patent for ‘[t]he
ornamental design for a pattern for a chair[,]’” in which “[e]ach figure in the patent
was now described as a view of a ‘design for a pattern for a chair.’”153 The Examining
Attorney, Kelley Donnelly, accepted these revisions as sufficient, and the ‘946 Patent
was granted on March 19, 2013.154 In the following two years, Curver used the design
encompassed by the ‘946 Patent on chairs, as claimed, as well as on other items, such
as home storage baskets.155 Indeed, on July 13, 2015, Duvigneau and Yaacov filed an
application for a design patent in the same “Y” pattern under the title of “[t]he
ornamental design for a basket[,]” as shown in Figure 3.156

Id. See also U.S. Patent Appl. No. 29/389,254 (filed Apr. 8, 2011).
U.S. Patent Appl. No. 29/389,254, Docket No. 31464D, Doc. No. 2083681, Reel 027262 Frames
0161–63 (filed Apr. 8, 2011) (assigned to Curver Luxembourg, SARL, on Nov. 20, 2011, recorded Nov.
21, 2011).
151 Curver Luxembourg, SARL v. Home Expressions, Inc., Civ. No. 2:17-cv-4079-KM-JBC, 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3792, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2018).
152 Id.; see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.153(a) (2020) (“The title of the design must designate the particular
article. No description, other than a reference to the drawing, is ordinarily required. The claim shall
be in formal terms to the ornamental design for the article (specifying name) as shown, or as shown
and described.”); MPEP, supra note 89, § 1503.01(a) (outlining the requirements set out in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.153(a)).
153 Curver Luxembourg, SARL, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3792, at *2.
154 U.S. Patent No. D677,946 S (filed Apr. 8, 2011) (issued Mar. 19, 2013).
155 Curver Luxembourg, SARL, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3792, at *2.
156 U.S. Patent No. D777,434 S fig. 4 (issued Jan. 31, 2017). See also U.S. Patent Appl. No.
29/533,009 (filed July 13, 2015).
149
150
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Figure 3
Duvigneau and Yaacov assigned this application to Curver on October 10, 2015,157
and this patent (“the ‘434 Patent”) was granted on January 31, 2017.158 As with the
‘946 Patent, the ‘434 Patent solely claimed the use of the ornamental “Y” design on a
basket, and the claim contained the limiting language of “for a basket[,]” similar to the
accepted revision of “for a chair” in the case of the ‘946 Patent.159
A. District Court Decision
At or before the issuing of the ‘434 Patent, Home Expressions was selling “storage
baskets that are allegedly ‘identical’ to baskets sold by Curver.”160 In addition to
“contain[ing] ‘each element of the claimed design in the ‘946 Patent,’”161 “On June 6,
2017, Curver filed a complaint against Home Expressions[]” in federal district court in
Home Expressions’ home state of New Jersey, “claiming that the manufacture, use,
sale, offer for sale, and/or importation of Home Expressions’ basket constitute[d]
patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271 et seq.”162 Curver alleged that “Home
Expressions’ basket even contains the unprotected elements of Curver’s basket, such
as an alternating matte and glossy finish on the bottom of the basket,” as shown in

157 U.S. Patent Appl. No. 29/533,009, Docket No. 25476US01_446373-215, Reel 036804 Frames
0271–73 (filed July 13, 2015) (assigned to Curver Luxembourg, SARL, on Oct. 10, 2015, recorded Oct.
15, 20165).
158 U.S. Patent No. D777,434 S (filed July 13, 2015) (issued Jan. 31, 2017).
159 Id.
160 Curver Luxembourg, SARL v. Home Expressions, Inc., Civ. No. 2:17-cv-4079-KM-JBC, 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3792, at *2–3 (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2018).
161 Id. at *3. Despite the issuance of the ‘434 Patent prior to the date at which Curver filed its
complaint alleging that Home Expressions infringed its patented designs, Curver appears to have only
alleged that Home Expressions infringed the design contained in the ‘946 Patent.
162 Curver Luxembourg, SARL, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3792, at *3.
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Figure 4, which “clearly establish[ed] that Home Expressions copied Curver’s basket
design.”163

Figure 4
In its complaint, Curver sought standard patent infringement remedies available
to the owner of a valid design patent:164 an injunction preventing the defendant’s use,
manufacture, sale, or distribution of the infringing article;165 an accounting of lost
profits and an award of treble damages;166 and a disgorgement of Home Expressions’
163 Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 3 ¶¶ 11–12, Curver Luxembourg, SARL v. Home
Expressions, Inc., Civ. No. 2:17-cv-4079-KM-JBC (D.N.J. June 6, 2017), ECF No. 1. See also Curver
Luxembourg, SARL, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3792, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2018). The image included as
Figure 4 is from Curver’s separate design patent for baskets (the ‘434’ Patent), granted six months
prior to the filing of this complaint. It is unclear why Curver chose to allege solely that Home
Expressions infringed the design of the ‘946 Patent, when a parallel or substituted claim of
infringement of the ‘434 Patent would have achieved largely the same end. U.S. Patent No.
D777,434 S fig. 5 (filed July 13, 2015).
164 Id.; see also Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 3–4, Prayer for Relief, Curver
Luxembourg, SARL v. Home Expressions, Inc., Civ. No. 2:17-cv-4079-KM-JBC (D.N.J. June 6, 2017),
ECF No. 1.
165 See Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 3, Prayer for Relief cl. (b), Curver Luxembourg,
SARL v. Home Expressions, Inc., Civ. No. 2:17-cv-4079-KM-JBC (D.N.J. June 6, 2017), ECF No. 1
(requesting that the court “permanently enjoin Defendant Home Expressions . . . from directly or
indirectly making, having made, selling, offering for sale, distributing, using, or importing into the
United States products that infringe” the ‘946 Patent). See also 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2020) (“The several
courts having jurisdiction under this title [35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.] may grant injunctions in accordance
with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as
the court deems reasonable.”).
166 See Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 3-4, Prayer for Relief cl. (d), (f), Curver
Luxembourg, SARL v. Home Expressions, Inc., Civ. No. 2:17-cv-4079-KM-JBC (D.N.J. June 6, 2017),
ECF No. 1 (requesting that the court order “Home Expressions to account for and pa to Curver all
damages caused by Home Expressions’ infringement” of the ‘946 Patent “including lost profits and
interest,” and that the court “award[] treble damages pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 284”). See also 35 U.S.C.
§ 284 (2020) (“Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to
compensate for the infringement . . . together with interest and costs as fixed by the court . . . [and]
the court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.”).
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total profit from the sale of its baskets.167 “Home Expressions filed a motion to dismiss
Curver’s claims on July 24, 2017.”168
In determining whether Curver had adequately pled a complaint under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for its case to survive Home Expressions’ motion to
dismiss, the district court needed to assess the “facial plausibility . . . that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged[]”—here, patent infringement.169 In
doing so, the court conducted a complete “patent infringement analysis[, which]
involves two steps: claim construction and claim comparison.”170 The first step of this
analysis is for the court to “simply construe the design patents as they are shown in
the patent drawings[,]”171 as “[c]laim construction is an issue of law committed to the
district judge for determination.”172 Because “[d]esign patents are typically claimed as
shown in drawings,” and indeed are constrained to one (usually visually described)
claim per patent, “claim construction must be adapted to the pictorial setting.”173 As
the district court noted, this analysis must be carefully undertaken, as “[d]epictions of
the claimed design in words can easily distract from the proper infringement analysis
of the ornamental patterns and drawings.”174 The MPEP suggests a best practice for
overcoming this distraction, in noting that “as a rule the illustration in the drawing is
its own best description[,]” and therefore it is the best reference point for construing
the scope of the patent’s claim.175
In conducting this first step analysis of Curver’s claim as laid out in the ‘946
Patent, the district court examined the scope of the patent in light of “(1) prosecution
history estoppel and (2) the scope of the patent more generally.”176 In examining the
167 See Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 3, Prayer for Relief cl. (e), Curver Luxembourg,
SARL v. Home Expressions, Inc., Civ. No. 2:17-cv-4079-KM-JBC (D.N.J. June 6, 2017), ECF No. 1
(requesting that the court “award[] to Curver the extent of Home Expressions’ total profit derived
from sales of the accused basket design[]”). See also 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2020) (“Whoever during the term
of a patent for a design, without license of the owner” infringes the patent in that design “shall be
liable to the owner to the extent of his total profit,” provide that “he shall not twice recover the profit
made from the infringement.”).
168 Curver Luxembourg, SARL v. Home Expressions, Inc., Civ. No. 2:17-cv-4079-KM-JBC, 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3792, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2018). See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Home Expressions Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss, Curver Luxembourg, SARL v. Home
Expressions, Inc., Civ. No. 2:17-cv-4079-KM-JBC (D.N.J. July 24, 2017), ECF No. 13-1.
169 Curver Luxembourg, SARL, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3792, at *4 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
170 Id. at *6.
171 Id. (citing MSA Prods., Inc. v. Nifty Home Prods., Inc., 883 F. Supp. 2d 535, 540–41 (D.N.J.
2012)).
172 Id. (citing Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 789 F.3d 1335, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2015)). See
also Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 977 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d 517 U.S. 370
(1996) (holding that claim construction is “a matter of law exclusively for the court”).
173 Curver Luxembourg, SARL, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3792, at *7 (quoting Crocs, Inc. v. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 598 F.3d 1294, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.153(a) (2020) (“The claim shall be
in formal terms to the ornamental design for the article (specifying name) as shown, or as shown and
described. More than one claim is neither required nor permitted.”).
174 Curver Luxembourg, SARL, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3792, at *7 (quoting Crocs, Inc. v. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 598 F.3d 1294, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). See also Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543
F.3d 665, 679 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Contessa Food Prods., Inc. v. Conagra, Inc., 282 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed.
Cir. 2002).
175 MPEP, supra note 89, § 1503.01.
176 Curver Luxembourg, SARL, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3792, at *9.
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prosecution history of the ‘946 Patent, the district court noted that while a judge must
“look at the requisite drawings in design patents to determine whether a surrender
has occurred[,]”177 the “language used in a design patent, such as the title, is relevant
to the infringement analysis[,]”178 because such language—and especially the title—
“can help delineate the scope of the design patent’s protections.”179 This interpretation
of a design patent’s title as limiting the claimed design was relatively unprecedented—
the district court itself could only cite to two published cases (in the District Courts for
the Eastern District of Arkansas180 and the Eastern District of Michigan,181
respectively) to support this proposition—and it in effect guided the entire analysis of
the case. The court determined that Curver’s “design patent was explicitly and
intentionally narrowed to one article of manufacture during the prosecution history[]”
when it “resubmitted the design patent as ‘[t]he ornamental design for a pattern for a
chair.’”182 According to the district court, “Curver surrendered a claim for an
ornamental design ‘for furniture’”183 when it resubmitted its patent application in
response to an Office Action, and Curver “accepted [instead] a design patent for an
ornamental pattern ‘for a chair[]’” and only for a chair.184
The district court’s reasoning in this regard is both unprecedented and largely in
conflict with the object and purpose of the design patent statute. The court reasoned
that because a design patent protects “an ornamental design for an article of
manufacture[,]”185 and because “[t]he title of the design must designate the particular
article[]” of manufacture,186 the claim is limited solely to that specific article of
manufacture.187 To the contrary, the MPEP specifies that “the subject matter” of a
design patent “is the design embodied in or as applied to an article of manufacture (or
portion thereof) and not the article itself.”188 Furthermore, the cases that the district
court relied upon in determining that “design patents are limited in scope to the article
of manufacture the design patent claims[]”189 present significantly different
circumstances from those in Curver’s complaint, and mainly involve changes in
medium and form of presentation190 (i.e., changing a design from a design patent
protecting a three-dimensional hat to a two-dimensional depiction on a shirt,191 or

177 Id. at *10–11 (quoting Pacific Coast Marine Windshields Ltd. V. Malibu Boats, LLC, 739 F.3d
694, 702 (Fed. Cir. 2014)).
178 Id. at *11.
179 Id. at *11 (citing P.S. Prods., Inc. v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 3d 795, 802–03 (E.D.
Ark. 2014)).
180 P.S. Prods., Inc. v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 3d 795, 802–03 (E.D. Ark. 2014).
181 Kellman v. Coca-Cola Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d 670, 679–80 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
182 Curver Luxembourg, SARL, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3792, at *11–12 (quoting U.S. Patent No.
D677,946 S (issued Mar. 19, 2013)).
183 Id. at *12 (quoting U.S. Patent Appl. No. 29/389,254 (filed Apr. 8, 2011)).
184 Id. (quoting U.S. Patent No. D677,946 S (issued Mar. 19, 2013)).
185 35 U.S.C. § 171(a) (2020).
186 37 C.F.R. § 1.153 (2020).
187 Curver Luxembourg, SARL, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3792, at *12.
188 MPEP, supra note 89, § 1502 (emphasis added).
189 Curver Luxembourg, SARL, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3792, at *15.
190 See Vigil v. Walt Disney Co., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22853, at *9-*10 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 1998)
(a keychain does not infringe the design patent for a duck call (whistle) solely because they are both
in the basic shape of a hockey stick).
191 Kellman v. Coca-Cola Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d 670 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
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depicting a three-dimensional stun gun in an online video game192), or a grammatical
change in the title of a claim that was proposed by the Examining Attorney “[f]or
accuracy.”193 According to the district court, “Curver surrendered [the] application of
its patent to anything that was not a chair[,]”194 and accordingly the construed scope of
the ‘946 Patent as “limited to an ornamental ‘Y’ pattern as shown in the patent’s
figures, as used in chairs[]” and “not extend[ing] to other products or articles of
manufacture.”195
For the second part of the district court’s analysis of Home Expressions’ motion to
dismiss Curver’s claim, the court took “the design patent’s claims (as now construed)”
and “compared [the claim] to the allegedly infringing products.”196 Unlike the first step
of the patent infringement analysis, “[t]his step involves a factual determination[]” in
which, “[w]hen considering infringement of a design patent, courts use the ‘ordinary
observer’ test.”197 This test has remained virtually unchanged since it was articulated
by Justice William Strong in the 1872 design patent case of Gorham Co. v. White;198
under this test, a court must find that infringement occurs
[I]f, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser
usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, [or] if the resemblance
is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase one
supposing it to be the other, the first one patented is infringed by the other.199
This test was incorporated into the Patent Act of 1952.200 In applying the ordinary
observer test, a court must determine whether “the accused article embodies the
patented design or any colorable imitation of it.”201 If, “as a matter of law[] no
reasonable factfinder could find infringement[,]” then a court “may dismiss claims of

P.S. Prods., Inc. v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 3d 795 (E.D. Ark. 2014).
Minka Lighting, Inc. v. Craftmade Int’l, Inc., No. 3-00-cv-0888-x, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27471,
at *7 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2001) (citing U.S. Patent Appl. No. 0/54,391 (filed May 14, 1996)).
194 Curver Luxembourg, SARL, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3792, at *16.
195 Id. at *18.
196 Id. at *7 (citing PC Connector Sols., LLC v. SmartDisk Corp., 406 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
2005)).
197 Id. (quoting Crocs, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 598 F.3d 1294, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
198 Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1872).
199 Id.; see also Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 670–71 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
200 Curver Luxembourg, SARL v. Home Expressions, Inc., Civ. No. 2:17-cv-4079-KM-JBC, 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3792, at *7 (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2018) (“this test was codified in the Patent Act of 1952[.]”).
The modern articulation of the test is found in Section 289 of the Patent Act, which states that
Whoever during the term of a patent for a design, without license of the owner, (1)
applies the patented design, or any colorable imitation thereof, to any article of
manufacture for the purpose of sale, or (2) sells or exposes for sale any article of
manufacture to which such design or colorable imitation has been applied[,] shall
be liable to the owner to the extent of his total profit, but not less than $250,
recoverable in any United States district court having jurisdiction of the parties.
35 U.S.C. § 289 (2020). See also Pacific Coast Marine Windshields Ltd. V. Malibu Boats, LLC, 739
F.3d 694, 701 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 670–71.
201 Curver Luxembourg, SARL, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3792, at *8 (citing Egyptian Goddess, Inc.
v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
192
193
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design infringement on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion[.]”202 Even though a court must place
the burden of persuasion on the alleged infringer in analyzing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,203
the district court recognized that for claim comparison prong of its analysis of Home
Expressions’ motion to dismiss, such a burden rested on the plaintiff, Curver.204
The district court’s analysis of whether Home Expressions’ basket infringed upon
the ‘946 Patent was predicated upon the premise (unsupported in the opinion by even
a single statute, regulation, or case) that the ‘946 Patent “protects only a pattern for a
chair[,]” and therefore “[i]t does not protect that same pattern on a basket.”205 While
noting that “Curver argue[d] that a design patent confers protection whenever an
ordinary observer would view the two designs as substantially the same—regardless
of the article of manufacture on which the design is located[,]”206 the court rejected this
reading of the plain language of 35 U.S.C. § 289207 in favor of the interpretations
adopted in three district court cases that, as it turns out, did not hinge on such a
determination.208
The district court conceded that “[i]t is true that the ‘Y’ design on the Home
Expressions[] basket is substantially similar to the ‘Y’ design shown in the ‘946
Patent.”209 Under normal design patent analysis, and under the plain language of the
design patent infringement statute, the court would have no choice but to deny Home
Expressions’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion upon reaching this determination.210 Here, however,
the district court instead noted that “[d]esign features aside, a basket is not a chair,
and could not be mistaken for one.”211 Under this logic, the court determined that—
contrary to the plain language of the infringement statute—“[d]esign patents are
202 Id. (citing Egyptian Goddess, 543 F.3d at 678). See also Vigil v. Walt Disney Co., No. 99-1310,
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6231, at *1–*2 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 5, 2000) (unpublished table decision) (“the district
court did not exceed its discretion in dismissing the action on its merits[]” when it could not find that
an ordinary observer would confuse the patented design and the accused product).
203 See, e.g., Curver Luxembourg, SARL, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3792, at *3 (“In deciding a motion
to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must take all allegations in the complaint as true and view
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”). See also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975)
(interpreting the burden of proof in a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6) (2018)).
204 Curver Luxembourg, SARL, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3792, at *19 (citing Richardson v. Stanley
Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
205 Id. at 17.
206 Id. (emphasis added).
207 See 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2020) (assessing liability for any individual who “(1) applies the patented
design, or any colorable imitation thereof, to any article of manufacture for the purpose of sale, or (2)
sells or exposes for sale any article of manufacture to which such design or colorable imitation has
been applied” (emphasis added)).
208 See P.S. Prods., Inc. v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 3d 795, 801–03 (E.D. Ark. 2014)
(depicting a three-dimensional stun gun in an online video game does not infringe the patent in the
gun’s three-dimensional design); Kellman v. Coca-Cola Co., 280 F. Supp. 2d 670, 679–89 (E.D. Mich.
2003) (depicting a three-dimensional hat as a two-dimensional image on a shirt does not infringe the
patent in the hat’s three-dimensional design); Vigil v. Walt Disney Co., No. C-97-4147 MHP, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22853, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 1998) (a keychain does not infringe the design patent for
a duck call (whistle) solely because they are both in the basic shape of a hockey stick).
209 Curver Luxembourg, SARL, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3792, at *19.
210 See 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2020). See also Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1295
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (“The patentee must establish that an ordinary observer, familiar with the prior art
designs, would be deceived into believing that the accused product is the same as the patented
design.”).
211 Curver Luxembourg, SARL, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3792, at *19–20.
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limited to their article of manufacture and do not provide protection outside of those
bounds[,]” and accordingly, Home Expressions’ motion to dismiss was granted.212
Shortly thereafter, Curver filed a timely appeal.213
B. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Decision
Upon hearing Curver’s appeal, the Federal Circuit acknowledged that this case
“is a case of first impression.”214 While acknowledging the “atypical situation” in which
“all of the drawings” in the ‘946 Patent “fail to depict an article of manufacture for the
ornamental design[,]” the court “address[ed] for the first time whether claim language
specifying an article of manufacture can limit the scope of a design patent, even if that
article of manufacture is not actually illustrated in the figures.”215 Unlike in past cases
where an article of manufacture was represented in some of the patent’s figures, the
‘946 Patent’s drawings (as shown in Figures 1–4 above) “are devoid of any chair
illustrations[]” despite the patent’s title of a “pattern for a chair.”216 The Federal
Circuit therefore characterized Curver’s asserted rights in the ornamental “Y” design
embodied in the ‘946 Patent as “a request for a patent on a surface ornamentation per
se.”217
By defining Curver’s claim in regard to the ‘946 Patent in such broad terms—a
broader definition of the scope of the ‘946 Patent than Curver itself claimed218—the
Federal Circuit all but eliminated the possibility of overturning the district court’s
decision. The impossibility of such an outcome was underscored when the court
observed that the “law has never sanctioned granting a design patent for a surface
ornamentation in the abstract such that the patent’s scope encompasses every possible
article of manufacture to which the surface ornamentation is applied.”219 The Federal
Circuit cited to a variety of century-old precedents220 to support this assertion, all the
Id. at *20.
See Notice of Appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit, Curver Luxembourg,
SARL v. Home Expressions, Inc., Civ. No. 2:17-cv-4079-KM-JBC (D.N.J. July 30, 2018).
214 Curver Luxembourg, SARL v. Home Expressions, Inc., 938 F.3d 1334, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
215 Id. at 1339–40.
216 Id. at 1339. Compare id. at 1337–39 with Pac. Coast Marine Windshields Ltd. v. Malibu Boats,
LLC, 739 F.3d 694, 702 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[I]n design patents, unlike utility patents, the claimed scope
is defined by drawings rather than by language[.]”). See In re Daniels, 144 F.3d 1452, 1456 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (“It is the drawings of the design patent that provide the description of the invention.”); see also
In re Mann, 861 F.2d 1581, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“The claim at bar, as in all design cases, is limited
to what is shown in the application drawings.”).
217 Curver Luxembourg, SARL, 938 F.3d at 1339.
218 See id. at 1339 n. 1 (“In its Reply, Curver argues that the figures [of the ‘946 Patent] depict a
‘three-dimensional panel structure that includes the ornamental Y pattern,’ and that under Samsung
Electronics Co. v. Apple Inc., 137 S. Ct. 429, 435, 196 L. Ed. 2d. 363 (2016), this ‘panel’ provides the
requisite ‘article of manufacture’ because it is a ‘component’ of a product.”). See also Reply Brief of
Plaintiff-Appellant at 8, Curver Luxembourg, SARL v. Home Expressions, Inc., 938 F.3d 1334 (Fed.
Cir. 2019) (No. 18-02214).
219 Curver Luxembourg, SARL, 938 F.3d at 1339.
220 See id. at 1340 (Specifically, the Federal Circuit’s opinion cites to Gorham Co. v. White, 81
U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 524 (1872)) (“The acts of Congress which authorize the grants of patents for
designs” envisage “not an abstract impression, or picture, but an aspect given to those objects
212
213
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while misconstruing Curver’s asserted scope of the ‘946 Patent as contrary to “longstanding precedent, unchallenged regulation, and agency practice [that] all
consistently support the view that design patents are [not] granted [for] . . . a design
per se[.]”221 However, the nature of the design patents at issue in these cases is
inherently different from the nature of the ‘946 Patent, in one fundamental manner:
while the claimed design in one case, Ex parte Cady,222 was outside the bounds of
patentable subject matter,223 and the design in the other case, Gorham Co. v. White,224
involved a design patent claiming “the configuration or shape of an article”225 of
manufacture,226 the subject matter of the ‘946 Patent is a design for “the surface
ornamentation applied to an article of manufacture[.]”227 Until the Federal Circuit’s
review of Curver’s appeal, it was unclear whether a statement by the C.C.P.A. in the
1956 case In re Glavas “suggested that a surface ornamentation for an article of
manufacture can be anticipated by a prior art article that shares the same surface
ornamentation, even though the prior art article is completely unrelated, i.e., nonanalogous art, to the article shown in the design patent.”228 As courts “have historically
used the same test to determine anticipation and infringement[,]” this precedent
implied that a design claimed as applied to one article of manufacture, if reproduced
on another article of manufacture in such a manner that a design patent application

mentioned in the acts.”)); see also Ex parte Cady, 1916 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 57, 62-63 (1916) (“A
disembodied design or a mere picture is not the subject of [design] patent, and it follows that the
specification must not so indicate . . . The invention is not the article and is not the design per se, but
is the design applied.”); but see MPEP, supra note 89, § 1504.02 (“Anticipation does not require that
the claimed design and the prior art be from analogous arts.”).
221 Curver Luxembourg, SARL, 938 F.3d at 1340.
222 1916 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 57 (1916).
223 Id. at 62. The design claimed was the following image:

Ex parte Cady, 1916 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 57, 61 (containing the visual claim of Article of Manufacture,
U.S. Patent No. D50,236 fig. 1 (issued Jan. 30, 1917)). This design was rejected as it failed to specify
“any possible embodiment of the picture of the design[,]” in a two-dimensional or three-dimensional
form. Id. at 63. Furthermore, as an original, fixed graphic work, the claimed drawing was better served
by the protections of copyright. See generally Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075
(1909) (outlining the subject matter of copyright as was in force at the time of Ex parte Cady). See
generally Sarah Burstein, The Patented Design, 83 TENN. L. REV. 161, 199–202 (2015).
224 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511 (1872).
225 MPEP, supra note 89, § 1502.
226 Gorham Co., 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) at 512 (The patent in this case was “for a new design for the
handles of tablespoons and forks[.]”).
227 MPEP, supra note 89, § 1502.
228 Curver Luxembourg, SARL v. Home Expressions, Inc., 938 F.3d 1334, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2019)
(citing In re Glavas, 230 F.2d 447, 450 (C.C.P.A. 1956)).
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for that second application of the design would be anticipated by the first patented
design, would constitute infringement of the claimed surface ornamentation.229
While the Federal Circuit “disagree[d]” with this interpretation, largely due to an
interpretation of the “ordinary observer” test from the 2008 decision Egyptian Goddess,
Inc. v. Swisa, Inc.,230 it is unclear whether the court based this disagreement on an
analysis of the surface ornamentation as applied to Home Expressions’ basket, or
rather—like the district court—based their decision on the simple fact that a basket is
not a chair, and could not be mistaken for one.”231 In any event, the Federal Circuit
“affirm[ed] the district court’s grant of Home Expressions’ motion to dismiss the
complaint for failure to state a plausible claim of design patent infringement[,]”232 and
signed off on an opinion that may well have fundamentally re-shaped design patent
law.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR DESIGN PATENTS
For the majority of attorneys—and even for the majority of those who specialize
in intellectual property law—it is quite possible that the Federal Circuit’s decision in
Curver barely registered as news, if there was any notice of it at all. For members of
the patent bar, the decision was undoubtedly noticed, and the reactions of practitioners
range from nonplussed to concerned. While industry-specific legal news reporters
covered the case in an average of approximately one thousand words or less,233 law firm
229 Id. See, e.g., Peters v. Active Mfg. Co., 129 U.S. 530, 537 (1889) (“That which infringes, if later,
would anticipate if earlier.”); Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1239
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[I]t has been well established for over a century that the same test must be used for
both infringement and anticipation[.]”).
230 Curver Luxembourg, SARL, 938 F.3d at 1342 (citing Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543
F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc)).
231 Curver Luxembourg, SARL v. Home Expressions, Inc., Civ. No. 2:17-cv-4079-KM-JBC, 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3792, at *19–20 (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2018).
232 Curver Luxembourg, SARL, 938 F.3d at 1343.
233 Author’s calculation (averaging 956 words per article). The seven news articles identified that
discussed the Curver opinion ranged in length from 123 words (from the American Intellectual
Property Law Association) to 2,254 words (from the New York Law Journal). See Dennis Crouch &
Sarah Burstein, Design Patents After Curver Luxembourg: Design FOR an Article of Manufacture,
PATENTLY-O
(Sept.
16,
2019),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2019/09/patents-luxembourgmanufacture.html [https:perma.cc/SB2D-FRXV]; Kim Jordahl, Ordinary Observer Test Is ‘The Sole
Controlling Test for Determining Anticipation of Design Patents’, I.P.WATCHDOG (Sept. 18, 2019),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/09/18/federal-circuit-ordinary-observer-test-sole-controlling-testdetermining-anticipation-design-patents/id=113504/ [https:perma.cc/Y9SR-89GY]; Michael Tuner &
Tiffany Fidler, Design Patent Law After Curver Luxembourg, SARL v. Home Expressions Inc., TODAY’S
GENERAL COUNSEL (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.todaysgeneralcounsel.com/design-patent-law-aftercurver-luxembourg-sarl-v-home-expressions-inc/ [https:perma.cc/7FF6-W2QM]; Design Patent Title
Limits Patent Scope, Fed. Cir Says, AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASSOC. (Sept. 18, 2019),
https://www.aipla.org/detail/news/2019/09/18/design-patent-title-limits-patent-scope-fed.-cir-says
[https:perma.cc/DYW9-VUXQ]; Thomas Long, Scope of Design Patent for Overlapping “Y” Design Was
Limited to Chairs, WOLTERS KLUWER (Sept. 12, 2019), https://lrus.wolterskluwer.com/news/ip-lawdaily/scope-of-design-patent-for-overlapping-y-design-was-limited-to-chairs/94754/
[https:perma.cc/W9LC-FMKZ]; Curver v. Home Expressions is Straight but the Prosecution of its
Patent
Application
was
Curved,
DESIGN LAW PERSPECTIVES
(Sept.
15,
2019),
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reactions were both shorter (averaging under six hundred words) and more muted in
tone. 234 Overall, the legal industry (and specifically, the patent bar) appears to
acknowledge that the holding in Curver is significant because it fundamentally reshapes two important aspects of design patent law: the role of a design patent’s verbal
language (i.e., the title and verbal claim), and the scope of the prior art that can
anticipate a claimed design.
A. Title and Claim After Curver Luxembourg
Before the Federal Circuit decided Curver, the rules governing a design patent’s
title and claim were relatively clear and well-understood.235 An applicant could file a
claim for a design as applied to an article of manufacture, or for the configuration
thereof,236 provided that the title and the written claim specified “the article in which
the design is embodied by the name generally known and used by the public[.]”237

https://www.designlawperspectives.com/blog/curver-v-home-expressions-is-straight-but-theprosecution-of-its-patent-application-was-curved [https:perma.cc/THG8-A5RD]; Milton Springut,
Federal Circuit Decision Raises Issues About Scope of Design Patents, 262 N.Y. L. J. (Oct. 23, 2019)
[https:perma.cc/BXL2-FKFX].
234 Author’s calculation, from a survey of nine law firms with design patent practices (averaging
at 508 words per article). See Lowell Jacobson & Manish Mehta, Curver Reaffirms Alice Analogue for
Design Patents, BENESCH (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.beneschlaw.com/resources/curver-reaffirmsalice-analogue-for-design-patents.html [https://perma.cc/TAV4-NPSS]; Michelle Yongyuan Rice,
Claim Language Could Limit Design Patent Where Specific Article of Manufacture Not Shown in
Figures, FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW, GARRETT & DUNNER (Oct. 4, 2019),
https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/blogs/federal-circuit-ip/claim-language-could-limit-designpatent-where-specific-article-of-manufacture-not-shown-in-figures.html
[https://perma.cc/NB2GTTZV]; Design Patent Limited by Claim Text Notwithstanding Limitation’s Absence from Illustrations,
FISH & RICHARDSON (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.fr.com/fcs/curver-luxembourg-v-home-expressions/
[https://perma.cc/M4R4-4EW4]; John Evans & Kerry Barrett, Verbal Aspects of Claim Limits Design
Patent Scope in Cuver Luxembourg v. Home Expressions,
JONES DAY (Sept. 2019),
https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2019/09/verbal-claims-limit-design
[https://perma.cc/G2ZDLQXB]; Federal Circuit Rules Design Patent Scope Can Be Limited by Claim Language, MAIER &
MAIER (Sept. 17, 2019), https://maierandmaier.com/federal-circuit-rules-design-patent-scope-can-belimited-by-claim-language/ [https://perma.cc/6YW7-PM7T]; John Hemmer, Kenneth Davis & Vishal
Parikh, Federal Circuit Limits Scope of Design Patent to Specific Article of Manufacture, MORGAN
LEWIS (Sept. 20, 2019), https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/federal-circuit-limits-scope-of-designpatent-to-specific-article-of-manufacture
[https://perma.cc/DRD7-4LWH];
Gary
Koo,
Cuver
Luxembourg, SARL v. Home Expressions Inc., OLIFF (Sept. 2019), [https://perma.cc/B95L-TXRB];
Nika Aldrich et al., Latest Federal Court Cases, 9/16/19, SCHWABE, WILLIAMSON & WYATT (Sept. 16,
2019),
https://www.schwabe.com/newsroom-publications-curver-luxembourg-sarl-v-homeexpressions-inc-appeal-no-2018-2214-fed-cir-sept-12-2019 [https://perma.cc/MN9M-7SK2]; Angelo
Kakolyris, In Case of First Impression, Squire Patton Boggs Client Home Expressions Inc. Prevails in
Design Patent Case Before US Court of Appeals for Federal Circuit, SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS (Sept. 13,
2019),
https://www.squirepattonboggs.com/en/news/2019/09/in-case-of-first-impression-squirepatton-boggs-client-home-expressions-inc-prevails-in-design-patent-case-before-us-court-of-appealsfor-federal-circuit [https://perma.cc/2HPC-UG8R].
235 See Burstein, Costly Designs, supra note 114, at 112–17.
236 See In re Zahn, 617 F.2d 261, 268 (C.C.P.A. 1980) ("§ 171 . . . is inclusive of ornamental designs
of all kinds[,] including surface ornamentation as well as configuration of goods").
237 MPEP, supra note 89, §§ 1503.01(I), 1503.01(III).
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Because a design patent can only contain one claim,238 and because that claim is most
thoroughly disclosed in the drawings accompanying the single claim’s language, the
major focus of substantive examination in the past centered on the images presented
in the application itself.239 To this end, Examining Attorneys have been instructed in
the MPEP to “afford the applicant substantial latitude in the language of the
title/claim.”240 In the past few decades, the attention paid to the written aspects of a
design patent application appear to have been confined to ensuring conformity to such
seemingly technical requirements as that “[t]he title of the design must designate the
particular article[]” in which the design is embodied, or that the claim specify the name
of an article of manufacture.241 Beyond meeting these threshold requirements—almost
as checking off a box on a patent examination checklist—the Examining Attorney’s
focus during the substantive examination of a design patent application has been
centered near exclusively on the claimed design in its actual appearance, not just in
its design concept.”242 As this “actual appearance” is disclosed in the drawings
contained within an application,243 the drawings have attracted the main focus of
Examining Attorneys and of design patent applicants alike.
The decision in Curver has necessitated a fundamental shift in this focus with
regard to design patent applications. Where in the past it was theoretically possible
to recite an article of manufacture in a patent application, solely depict the design
claimed, and then claim infringement in a substantially similar design used in a
different article of manufacture,244 the Federal Circuit expressly disavowed this
possibility for future design patent applicants.245 Rather, it has now become clear that
“claim language could limit the scope of a design patent to a specific article of
manufacture where the claim language supplies the only instance of an article of
manufacture that appears nowhere in the figures.”246 Patent Bar members practicing
in the field of design patents have developed a series of recommendations stemming
from the Federal Circuit’s disavowal of the standard “[t]hat which infringes, if later,

238 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.153(a) (2020) (“More than one claim is neither required nor permitted.”).
Claims in design patents have generally taken the form of a sentence along the lines of “a design [for
an article of manufacture]” as shown in figures captioned as a view of “a design [for an article of
manufacture.]” See, e.g., In re Zahn, 617 F.2d 261, 267 (C.C.P.A. 1980); U.S. Patent No. D677,946 S
(filed Apr. 8, 2011) (issued Mar. 19, 2013).
239 37 C.F.R. § 1.153(a) (2020) (“The claim shall be in formal terms to the ornamental design . . .
as shown, or as shown and described.”). See also MPEP, supra note 89, § 1503.01(III) at 1500-7
(incorporating 37 C.F.R. § 1.153(a) into the substantive examination of a design patent); Curver
Luxembourg, SARL v. Home Expressions, Inc., Civ. No. 2:17-cv-4079-KM-JBC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3792, at *7 (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2018) (quoting Crocs, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 598 F.3d 1294, 1302 (Fed.
Cir. 2010)) (“[d]esign patents are typically claimed as shown in drawings”); In re Mann, 861 F.2d 1581,
1582 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“The claim at bar, as in all design cases, is limited to what is shown in the
application drawings.”).
240 MPEP, supra note 89, § 1503.01(I).
241 37 C.F.R. § 1.153(a) (2020).
242 Burstein, Visual Invention, supra note 28, at 187.
243 Id.
244 See Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 8, Curver Luxembourg, SARL v. Home Expressions,
Inc., 938 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (No. 18-02214) (citing In re Glavas, 230 F.2d 447, 450 (C.C.P.A.
1956)).
245 Curver Luxembourg, SARL v. Home Expressions, Inc., 938 F.3d 1334, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
246 Rice, supra note 235.
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would anticipate if earlier[]”247 approach to design patent applications. These
recommendations include that “[a]pplicants may want to take care in describing the
design, particularly partial designs, and consider if multiple design patent applications
should be filed to cover various articles[,]” and that “[f]or design patents that have
already issued, patentees may want to consider filing broadening [r]eissue applications
to proactively broaden out the claim language.”248 Most drastically, some attorneys
have recommended that design patent applicants such as Curver, who wish to protect
“designs that may be applied to a variety of different articles,” consider pursuing
copyright protection in that design—either as an alternative to a design patent or as a
means of “layering on” an additional level of protection . . . “to fully protect their
designs.”249 In short, the Curver decision has forced those most closely acquainted with
the world of design patents to recognize the limitations of the protections that design
patents afford, especially with regard to the limitations implicit in the written title and
claim of the patent application itself.
B. Re-Defining Infringement and Prior Art?
While the vast majority of the news coverage of Curver focused on the language
discussing how a design patent’s verbal claim and title can limit the scope of its
protection,250 the Federal Circuit’s decision also significantly impacted another aspect
of design patent law: in misapplying the 2008 Egyptian Goddess “ordinary observer”
standard to whether a subsequent similar design infringed on an earlier patented
design, the court to a certain extent rejected 130 years’ worth of established precedent
on how to properly identify references in the prior art.251 The standard for determining
whether such a later design would infringe an earlier patent had been settled no later
than 1889, when the Supreme Court issued its decision in Peters v. Active
Manufacturing Company252 and crafted the maxim “[t]hat which infringes, if later,
would anticipate if earlier.”253 As recently as in 2009—a full year after the Egyptian
Goddess decision that the Curver court cited to in rejecting the Peters
anticipation/infringement test—the Federal Circuit acknowledged in another decision
that “it has been well established for over a century that the same test must be used

Peters v. Active Mfg. Co., 129 U.S. 530, 537 (1889).
Hemmer, Davis & Parikh, supra note 235.
249 Id.
250 See, e.g., Design Patent Title Limits Patent Scope, Fed. Cir Says, AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASSOC.
(Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.aipla.org/detail/news/2019/09/18/design-patent-title-limits-patentscope-fed.-cir-says [https:perma.cc/DYW9-VUXQ]; Long, supra note 234; Rice, supra note 235; Design
Patent Limited by Claim Text Notwithstanding Limitation’s Absence from Illustrations, FISH &
RICHARDSON (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.fr.com/fcs/curver-luxembourg-v-home-expressions/
[https://perma.cc/M4R4-4EW4]; Hemmer, Davis & Parikh, supra note 235.
251 Curver Luxembourg, SARL v. Home Expressions, Inc., 938 F.3d 1334, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2019)
(citing Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc)). See, e.g.,
Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[I]t has been
well established for over a century that the same test must be used for both infringement and
anticipation[.]”).
252 Peters, 129 U.S. at 537.
253 Id.
247
248
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for both infringement and anticipation”—that is to say, that the concept embodied in
Peters was still the binding law of the land after Egyptian Goddess.254
When the court in Curver declined to apply the Peters rule to Curver’s
infringement claim, it did so on the basis that “the ‘sole test’ [of infringement or
anticipation] should be ‘the ordinary observer test’ based on substantial visual
similarity between the accused product and claimed design[.]”255 The court split hairs
over whether two articles “having a different ‘use’” from each other “but nevertheless
sharing ‘substantially the same appearance[]’”256 would constitute a sufficiently similar
appearance that the “‘ordinary observer’ could be deceived into purchasing Home
Expressions’ baskets believing they were the same as the patterned chairs claimed in
Curver’s patent.”257 However, from a purely logical standpoint—and in light of the
plain language of Section 289 of the Patent Act—the Curver court neither properly
applied the “ordinary observer” test from Egyptian Goddess, nor gave proper deference
to the Peters test for infringement, for three reasons.258
First, the court improperly applied the Egyptian Goddess standard in examining
whether an individual “could be deceived into purchasing Home Expressions’ baskets
believing they were the same as the patterned chairs claimed in Curver’s patent.”259
Like the district court, the Federal Circuit misconstrued the test for infringement here,
concluding that because “a basket is not a chair, and could not be mistaken for one[,]”260
that Home Expressions’ basket—containing the same ornamental “Y” pattern as was
claimed in the ‘946 Patent—could not exhibit “substantial visual similarity” to the
“claimed design” embodied in the ‘946 Patent (as applied to a chair).261 Accordingly,
the proper scope of inquiry for the court to consider was whether an “ordinary observer”
could confuse the design in the ‘946 Patent, as applied to a chair, with the design
employed by Home Expressions, as applied to a basket.262
Second, and related to the court’s misconstrued application of the Egyptian
Goddess infringement test, the Federal Circuit improperly applied the Peters
anticipation/infringement test to the ‘946 Patent and Home Expressions’ basket, in
light of over 60 years’ worth of precedent and in light of the plain language of Section
289 of the Patent Act. As established above, the court did not consider the designs at
issue, but rather determined that consumers would not be deceived based on the types
of articles of manufacture in which the designs were embodied. 263 As far back as 1956,
however, the C.C.P.A. had held that for anticipation of a design patent, “if the prior
art discloses any article of substantially the same appearance as that of the applicant,
it is immaterial what the use of such an article is.”264 For example, in In re Glavas, the
Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Curver Luxembourg, SARL, 938 F.3d at 1343 (citing Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543
F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc)).
256 Id. at 1342 (quoting In re Glavas, 230 F.2d 447, 450 (C.C.P.A. 1956)).
257 Id. (quoting Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc)).
258 Id. at 1342–43. See also 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2020).
259 Curver Luxembourg, SARL v. Home Expressions, Inc., 938 F.3d 1334, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
260 Curver Luxembourg, SARL v. Home Expressions, Inc., Civ. No. 2:17-cv-4079-KM-JBC, 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3792, at *19–20 (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2018).
261 Curver Luxembourg, SARL, 938 F.3d at 1343 (emphasis added).
262 Cf. Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2009);
Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
263 Curver Luxembourg, SARL, 938 F.3d at 1343 (emphasis added).
264 In re Glavas, 230 F.2d 447, 450 (C.C.P.A. 1956).
254
255
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Patent Office’s Board of Appeals affirmed the rejection of a design patent for a
swimming float, on the ground that its design was obvious in light of, inter alia, the
designs for a pillow, a baby supporter, soap, bottles, and a razor blade sharpener.”265
The plain language of Section 289 of the Patent Act supports the Glavas and
Peters anticipation/infringement test, reading that liability for design patent
infringement exists for any individual who “(1) applies the patented design, or any
colorable imitation thereof, to any article of manufacture for the purpose of sale, or (2)
sells or exposes for sale any article of manufacture to which such design or colorable
imitation has been applied[.]”266 In Curver, there was a patented design—the
ornamental “Y” pattern that was the subject of the ‘946 Patent—which was applied by
Home Expressions to an article of manufacture—a basket.267 Again, by rejecting this
application of the Peters anticipation/infringement test on the basis that “a basket is
not a chair, and could not be mistaken for one[,]”268 the district court and the Federal
Circuit undermined decades of established precedent governing the law of design
patent infringement.
Finally, in rejecting the possibility that Home Expressions’ basket infringed the
design in Curver’s ‘946 Patent, the Federal Circuit risked fundamentally re-shaping
the rules of substantive examination of a design patent for non-obviousness. As the
Federal Circuit has repeatedly stated, “it has been well established for over a century
that the same test must be used for both infringement and anticipation[.]”269 By
foreclosing the possibility that a design with an identical visual appearance does not
infringe a patented design solely on the basis that the later design was applied to a
different article of manufacture, the Curver court directly contradicted its 2009
decision in Titan Tire v. New Holland. The court in Titan Tire stated that in
determining whether a claimed design is anticipated by the prior art, “other ‘secondary’
references”—that is, references from different articles of manufacture—“‘may be used
to modify [a primary reference of a related type of article of manufacture] to create a
design that has the same overall visual appearance as the claimed design.’”270
In short, while before the Federal Circuit released its decision in Curver, “the
overall appearance, the visual effect as a whole of the design[]” controlled in deciding
whether a claimed design was anticipated by the prior art,271 now it appears that the
Rosen TSM variant for design patents272 and the Peters anticipation test are both
limited solely to prior art for the same type of article of manufacture—as again, if
substantial visual similarity can be avoided by observing that “a basket is not a chair,”
then a design for a basket cannot be rendered obvious by the design for a chair.273
Nevertheless, the extent to which the Curver decision re-shapes the substantive
Burstein, Visual Invention, supra note 28, at 183. See also Glavas, 230 F.2d at 448–49.
35 U.S.C. § 289 (2020) (emphasis added).
267 See generally Curver Luxembourg, SARL v. Home Expressions, Inc., Civ. No. 2:17-cv-4079KM-JBC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3792 (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2018).
268 Id. at *19–20.
269 Int’l Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
270 Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 566 F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting
Durling v. Spectrum Furniture Co., 101 F.3d 100, 103 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
271 In re Rosen, 673 F.2d 388, 390 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
272 See supra Part II(a)(ii).
273 Curver Luxembourg, SARL v. Home Expressions, Inc., Civ. No. 2:17-cv-4079-KM-JBC, 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3792 at *19–20 (D.N.J. Jan. 8, 2018).
265
266
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examination of design patents, and future infringement actions involving alreadyissued design patents, remains to be seen.
V. CONCLUSION
Design patents first arose from an industry demand to escape the strict
functionality requirement of utility patents, blending the artistic protections of
copyright theories with the ironclad rights of utility patent law.274 While their
trajectory once appeared to be in decline, in the past two decades design patents have
risen from the ashes to become an attractive form of protection once again in fashion,
engineering, and other industrial design industries.275 Inherent in this phoenix-like
resurgence is the struggle that has arisen as courts reconcile century-old precedent
with the modern day, leading to a tinderbox in which one inconsistent court decision
could act as a spark. The Federal Circuit issued such a decision in Curver, disguising
the fundamental reshaping of the role of a design patent’s title and verbal claim in
determining its scope, protection, and the relevant prior art as merely a basic
observation on the relevant article of manufacture.276 This spark having been dropped
into the tinderbox that is design patent law, a conflagration has started: while a slow
burn at first, the flames have now finally come into view.
As the misapplications of law present in Curver become visible in hindsight, the
industrial design and fashion industries must adapt to the new status quo of design
patent protection: significantly curtailed in regard to the protection of already-issued
patents that are now limited in scope to the specific article of manufacture to which
the design is applied,277 and yet considerably liberated in regard to prior art
anticipation (or a suddenly decreased incidence thereof) for new design patent
applications.278 While members of the Patent Bar offer panaceas ranging from
“multiple design patent applications . . . to cover various articles[]” to “broaden[ing]
out the claim language[]” to considerations of pursuing copyright protection in a design
“to fully protect” it, 279 the same general conclusion can be drawn in all circumstances: the
Curver decision has forced those most closely acquainted with the world of design
patents to recognize the limitations of the protections that design patents afford, just
as it has re-shaped the law of design patents itself in many regards. Absent a correction
by the Federal Circuit, this abrogation of over 130 years’ worth of settled design patent
law is here to stay; the increased role of title and verbal claims, the limited scope of
protection to one article of manufacture, and the newly narrowed field of prior art for
anticipation are merely a new reality in the reborn design patent industry.
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